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BOOK REVIEW

Fire and the Spirits
By
RENNARD STRICKLAND
Univ. of Okla. Press, Norman, Okla., 1975, pp. 260, $9.95
Karl Llewellyn dedicated his life to advancing the view that the
"stuff" of the law lay not in abstracted or synthesized rules, but
rather in those social and marketplace norms which regulate the
conduct of day-to-day life.' With Hoebel, he tested his thesis in the
study of the Cheyenne Indian legal institutions and found a legal
structure of "juristic beauty." 2 In Fire and the Spirits Rennard
Strickland gives us, in a well-researched, well-organized and highly
readable form, a unique study of an instance where both the "stuff"
of the law and the institutions which administered the law deviated
in substantial respects from the prevailing social mores of the community. The chronicle is a sad tale of the unraveling and ultimate
demise of the Cherokee Nation.
Professor Strickland's scholarly study of the evolution of the
Cherokee legal system-from clan revenge to an approximation of the
Anglo-American adversary system-is an allegory for the last third of
this century. Fire and the Spirits raises the most important issue for
Indians today: The survival of Indian tribal culture. Since their first
contact with the Europeans the central issue for Indians has been
survival, not only physically but culturally. In order for Indians to
plan for cultural survival it must be understood that the threat to
their culture is rooted in the very nature of society itself.'
The disparity between the philosophy of the American form of
government and the actual treatment Indians have received at the
government's hands has provided the basis for many articles and
books of apology. 4 A common but erroneous conclusion of this
reexamination is the "bad guy" theory. This theory posits that what
has happened to Indians over the last three centuries was the result
of evil men who set about each fiscal year to determine how best to
lie, cheat and steal from Indians. If this be true, Indian survival would
1. See Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs: The Problems of Juristic
Method, 49 Yale L.J. 1355 (1940).
2. K. Llewellyn & E. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way ix (1941).
3. See generally R. Berkhofer, Salvation and the Savage (Atheneum 1972); L. Hanke,
Aristotle and the American Indians (1975).
4. See H. Jackson, A Century of Dishonor: The Early Crusade for Indian Reform (Rolle
ed. 1965); W. Jacobs, Dispossessing the American Indian (1972); Cohen, Original Indian
Title, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 28 (1947).
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turn on the quality of men in office and hope would exist through
the ballot. But the variance between philosophy and practice is not
of capricious design. Rather, the problem is far more deep-rooted,
dangerous and intractable. The discrepancy is less a product of individual venality than a recognition that Indian societies and the
dominent American society reflect different cultural norms. Thus,
any norm of the dominated society that deviates significantly from
that of the dominant society is in danger of abolishment. And its
demise is not perceived as wrong, but rather is lauded as being in the
best interests of the dominated culture. Today we can be amused
over the seriousness of debate among the greatest of the Spanish
jurists at Valladolid in 1550 concerning whether heathen Indians
could be considered human beings.' Yet we become very serious and
defensive whetf it is suggested that Indian tribes may have the privilege to deny to their members concepts of "due process" and "equal
protection. '"6
II
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Cherokee civilization underwent as substantial a dislocation as any civilization in
modern times. Fraught with internal tensions and tribal schism, the
demise of traditional values and institutions and the ascendency of
new leadership and values, and plagued with a forced migration and
an external war, the Cherokees fought hard, although not successfully, to preserve their tribal culture, integrity and, ultimately, their
tribal existence. From this cultural pressure cooker, Professor Strickland dips into the social stew and describes the various changes in
mores and institutions, admirably investigating cause and effect.
It is commonly assumed that with the adoption of a written constitution and laws and the assumption of the accoutrements of a
nation-state, the Cherokees obtained legal order and institutions
where none had before existed. As Strickland convincingly demonstrates, that was not the case at all. The Cherokee acceptance of
positive law and formal legal institutions was both evolutionary and
revolutionary. While adoption of a foreign legal order was designed
to protect the Cherokees from external threat, it contributed substantially to social disintegration and the ultimate destruction of the
Cherokee Nation.
5. See Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians 23-27 (1975).
6. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § § 1302-03 (1970); de Raismes, Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 and the Pursuit of Responsible Tribal Self-Government, 20 S.D. L. Rev.
59 (1975); Lazarus, Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D.
L. Rev. 337 (1969).
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The ancient and traditional Cherokee way is best characterized as
clannish, communal and religious. The tribe was organized around
clans, and centralized leadership was informal and sporadic. Economic life was rudimentary, and the private accumulation of wealth
was virtually unknown, limited primarily to ceremonial purposes.
Social control was basically religious, both in its form and in its
administering institutions:
To the Cherokees law was the earthly representation of a divine
spirit order. They did not think of law as a set of civil or secular
rules limiting or requiring actions on their part. Public concensus and
harmony rather than confrontation and dispute, as essential elements of the Cherokee world view, were reflected in the ancient
concepts of the law. 7
This spiritual view of the law was reflected in the social leadership.
Except during wartime, the lawmakers were found in the priest class.
Strickland identifies three salient themes in the social history of
the Cherokees in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: (1) the
centralization of the tribal leadership; (2) the shift in economic
organization from communalism to the accumulation of private
property; and (3) the secularization of the law and concommitant
demise of the priest class as lawgivers. While Strickland's treatment
of the first two of these themes leaves much to be desired, the third
is well analyzed and clearly described.
As to the first of these themes-the centralization of the tribal
leadership-Strickland's description' is overly long and mechanical.
He identifies in great detail seven stages in this centralization process.
The Cherokee legal system, emerging from clan to court, went
through many stages. These developments beyond the traditional
system might be divided into steps, as follows: the secularization of
tribal government (1710 to 1789), emergence of Tribal Council
(1780 to 1808), council and regulation parties (1808 to 1817),
Chiefs and Warriors in National Assembly with Standing Committee
(1817 to 1820), reorganized government (1820 to 1827), constitutional Cherokee government (1827 to 1838), and Cherokee Nation
united (1839 to 1906). 9
The discussion is primarily discursive, sometimes leaving the reader
wishing to know more about social, cultural and economic factors
which pushed one stage into the next.
7. R. Strickland, Fire and the Spirits 10-11 (1975).
8. Id. at 53-72.
9. Id. at 53.
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While the discussion of the centralization of leadership may be too
long, the discussion of the second theme-the shift from communalism to the accumulation of private wealth-is almost nonexistent. After describing the religiosity of the ancient Cherokee law
and legal institutions, Strickland tantalizes the reader with the
following: "The expansion of the Carolina trade changed all this. The
values of the old life were significantly altered by shifts in the tribal
economic base."' 0 With the exception of briefly identifying two
manifestations of this shift-participation in the fur trade and the
development of commercial agriculture-this is the full extent of
Strickland's discussion of the economic shift. Left unanswered are
questions about the causative factors which influenced this change
and the social dislocation effected by it. This is all the more distressing, since the little information Strickland does give us indicates that
the shift in economic order was influenced at least partly by the
Cherokee contact with the increasingly obtrusive European culture.
Since the ultimate adoption of a legal order modeled after this
dominant culture is the central thesis of the book, further exploration of this factor would seem desirable.
The defects in Strickland's discussion of these first two themes,
however, are more than compensated for by his treatment of the
third strand he develops in the fabric of Cherokee social history.
Strickland finds several factors that contributed to the secularization
of the law and the demise of the priest class. First, the priests did
little to stem the economic shift to commercialism and private
acquisition. Indeed, rather than resist this threat to their position and
to the foundation of the Cherokee legal mores, the priests were
coopted by the very commercialism which ultimately undermined
their position of authority.
The priests' position was further impaired by the advent of Christian missionaries. Carrying with them not only the word of God but
presumably the word of commerce, the missionaries were quick to
exploit the priests' faltering hold on the Cherokee people. Finally,
the loss of faith in the priests was aggravated by the failure of the
priests as public healers. Since, in the traditional tribal view, the law
was personified in tribal leaders, the demise of the priest class
brought with it the breakdown of the religious underpinnings of the
law.
Something had to fill the vacuum created by the fall of the priests:
The prime qualification for leadership in the new Carolinadominated Cherokee world became the possession of commercial
10. Id. at 44.
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connections and an understanding of and ability to manipulate trade
and colonial aspirations. The colonies themselves first turned to the
priestly class to fill the vacuum. When it became apparent that
priestly support was waning, a new class of "Indian Kings" was
created by the South Carolina government. These were drawn from
the old Red portion of the tribal government.' 1
While the ascendancy of the war leadership to fill the vacuum
created by the demise of the priest class might have done much to
stem the threat from the encroaching European culture, any such
aspiration was short-lived. Tribal schism led to the exile to western
territories of the most aggressive faction of the warrior leaders. This
proved to be a staggering blow to the war leadership from which it
never recovered, thus leaving the way open for the primacy of still a
third group: the mixed-bloods, progeny of intermarriage between the
Cherokees and Europeans. As the mixed-bloods attained leadership
positions, the secularization of the law was accelerated. With a foot
in each culture, the mixed-bloods became a significant conduit for
the further supplanting of European values for traditional Cherokee
values.
As Strickland persuasively argues, while the rapid succession of
leadership did not alter the ultimate tribal goal-preservation of tribal
lands-the rapid turnover in leadership, together with the factors that
influenced the turnover, did undermine the ability of the Cherokees
to resist the advancing European culture. Rather than fight the external threat with internal resources, the Cherokees looked elsewhere
for means to resist. As Strickland states in what is the most concise
exposition of the thesis of the book:
Both full-blood and mixed-blood Cherokees stood united in
opposition to pressures to surrender tribal lands. The history of the
emergence of the Cherokee legal system might well be written as a
futile effort to block the series of treaties and acts which surrendered more and more of the ancient dominion and ultimately led
to the abolition of the Cherokee Nation.' 2
The adoption by the Cherokees of a constitution, written laws and
governmental structure modeled after those of the encroaching European culture did not represent a triumph of adaptation and acculturation. Rather, it reflected a last-ditch attempt by a threatened
culture to preserve itself and its traditional ways. "The Cherokees
sincerely believed, as Jefferson suggested, that they might save their
nation with the adoption of a new legal system of laws patterned
11. Id. at 47 (footnote omitted).
12. Id. at 51.
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'1
after those of the white man." 3 The Cherokees did adopt a written
constitution, a plethora of written statutes and a court system for
dispute resolution, all of which were fashioned after the Jeffersonian
model.
While describing the constitution and the court structure in detail,
Professor Strickland admirably resists the temptation to encumber
the discussion with infinite detail concerning the substance of the
various statutes. Rather, the discussion focuses on several examples
by which Strickland describes the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the adopted models. Thus, where the new laws closely followed
and responded to traditional ways and values, commanding a consensus of support, the experiment was successful. Where, however,
the adopted laws diverged substantially from ingrained custom and
accepted practice, the experience was not only unsuccessful, but
self-defeating.
Strickland demonstrates this in comparing the laws regulating
slavery 1 4 with those regulating wealth devolution." The model for
the regulation of slavery was'borrowed from the proximate southern
culture and was designed not to reflect traditional tribal values but to
protect the interests of a small class of wealthy mixed-bloods. While
the traditional Cherokee approach to slavery had not been reflected
in any substantial formal regulation, there had developed over the
eighteenth century well-recognized and adhered-to customs establishing social control. The positive law adopted by the Cherokees in
the nineteenth century was substantially inconsistent with this ingrained customary approach. The result was that "the needs of the
Cherokees [the wealthy mixed-bloods] responsible for the enactment of the [slavery I legislation were at such variance with the needs
and expectations of the majority of the tribe that the laws were
widely ignored."' 6
Such was not the case with the Cherokee legislation regulating
wealth devolution, however. Since the ancient Cherokee economic
life was basically communal, the traditional Cherokee ways had little
concern for the regulation of transfer of wealth upon death. Thus,
when the Cherokee government in the nineteenth century passed
legislation regulating wealth devolution, it broke new ground. Rather
than emulating the experience with the regulation of slavery, however, the laws enacted concerning transfer of wealth identified with

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

52.
78-83.
84-101.
83.
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and advanced traditional and universally accepted tribal goals and
values:
At least five major social policies or goals of Cherokee society are
reflected in the inheritance laws. Perhaps the most obvious of these
is the policy of strengthening the family social unit. Another equally
clear policy is the prevention of tribal lands from passing into the
control of non-citizens. A third is preventing marriage between
Cherokees and Negro slaves. The idea of equality of women is also
reflected in these inheritance laws. Finally, the anounced resistance
to Cherokee migration to the Cherokee Nation West motivated these
laws.1 7

The result was that the experience in regulating wealth devolution
was substantially more successful than the experience with respect to
regulation of slavery.
Superficially, the Cherokee experience in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the paradigm of successful Indian policy, both
from the Indian and European perspectives. From first contact with
the Europeans to the complete reconstruction of their society after
removal, the Cherokees appeared to have met numerous challenges at
each stage, adapting their society to include new values along with
the traditional values. This process of acculturation staved off-at
least for a period of time-the encroaching European culture. Professor Strickland refutes the concept that the Cherokees became
"White Indians." Indeed, Strickland forcefully establishes the
opposite conclusion: The Cherokee Nation at the time of its destruction was an Indian government with a strong foundation in
traditional tribal values.
It is evident, however, that ultimately the Cherokee policy of
adaptation and acculturation was a failure. Certainly the Cherokees
did not survive as a nation. More fundamentally, while the process of
adaptation may have forestalled for a period the ultimate triumph of
the Europeans, it did so at enormous costs. The process not only
sapped the Cherokees' will to resist, it also deprived them of the
most effective weapons with which to resist. The adoption of a
European-modeled legal system both undermined the traditional
repositories of cultural stability and imposed social norms foreign to
the traditional culture. The external threat, to a large extent, had
been internalized.
A similar dilemma faces the American Indian in the last third of
the twentieth century. Having been deprived of most of their lands,
Indians are now faced with a serious theat to their remaining culture
17. Id. at 97.
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by the imposition of Anglo-American legal norms. This twentiethcentury threat may be as substantial as was the nineteenth-century
threat to Indian lands. And it is to this problem that the Cherokee
experience addresses a particularly perverse allegory. For just as the
Cherokees, in the process of retaining as much of their culture as
possible, lost their lands and their status as a nation, twentiethcentury Indians, in preserving the remainder of their lands and tribal
status, are faced with the serious and immediate threat to their very
cultural existence.
III

The Cherokees correctly perceived the major protection for their
culture to reside in tribal lands, which would provide both a crucible
for the evolution of their own culture and a refuge from the encroaching European culture. The Cherokees ultimately lost their
lands, their status as a nation and the struggle. The two-fold importance of tribal land to Indian culture has not changed in the century
since the dissolution of the Cherokee nation. For contemporary
Indians, however, the major threat to their culture comes not from
loss of land, but from loss of control of the remaining land. This
threat finds its most vivid manifestation in the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968.' The intent of this legislation, which requires that
tribes adhere in their internal practices to constitutional-type,
enumerated duties, is to ensure that no American citizen be denied
certain fundamental liberties. While this motive may appear admirable in the abstract, the broad application of the statute by the
federal courts has created a serious threat to the survival of contemporary Indian cultures, a threat not unlike that presented to the
Cherokees in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The Indian Civil Rights Act is the culmination of a slow but
steadily intensifying progress of legislation intruding on the freedom
of tribal governments to conduct the internal affairs of the tribe.
Until the Major Crimes Act of 1885," 9 American Indian policy consisted of separating Indian tribes from non-Indians, leaving the tribes
free to govern their people in any manner they wished. As Chief
20
Justice Marshall held in the landmark case of Worcester v. Georgia,
Indian tribes were free to exercise all powers of government except
those which Congress explicitly removed from them. This freedom
was not constrained by constitutional limitations traditionally
18. 25 U.S.C. § § 1302-03 (1970).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1885), der. from Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385.
20. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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applied to other governments. This "apartheid" policy was possible
in a society in which an expanding frontier was both real and perceived. The Major Crimes Act of 1885 marked the end of two eras,
one for the country and one for the Indians. With the passing of the
last frontier, there were no longer lands to the west to which Indians
could be pushed away. The Indians and their traditional ways came
into closer physical proximity with the dominant American society.
As Indians and the dominant society settled into close physical
coexistence, the dominant society had a greater opportunity to
observe traditional Indian ways. Since there was no longer a frontier
beyond which Indians could be pushed, if the dominant society disliked what it saw of Indian ways, it had no choice but to change
those ways. The accomplishment of this end was sought through two
major devices: The Allotment Act of 1887,2" and the Major Crimes
Act of 1885. Through the Allotment Act, tribal lands, traditionally
held communally, were broken up and allotted to individual Indians.
The goal was to turn Indians into the image of the dominant society:
Yeoman farmers and God-fearing Christians. An incidental side effect
was to open up tribal lands to the ever-advancing Europeans.
The passage of the Major Crimes Act was the direct result of the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Crow Dog.2 2 In
Crow Dog the Court held that the Dakota territorial courts were
without jurisdiction to try an Indian accused of killing another
Indian on reservation lands. The underlying issue in the case involved
the punishment to be meted out to the convicted murderer. The
tribe chose to punish the murderer in the traditional manner, by
requiring penance and restitution. The neighboring settlers felt that
this procedure was uncivilized and barbaric and that justice could
only be served through execution by hanging.
The Major Crimes Act removed jurisdiction from the tribes to
adjudicate enumerated offenses, leaving intact the tribes' power to
adjudicate in any manner they wished offenses not specifically set
out in the statute. While the Act constituted an incursion into tribal
sovereignty, it was accomplished in a mode calculated to do the least
harm to traditional tribal practices. Tribes could continue to govern
themselves in their traditional manner except in those areas specifically removed by the statue. In those specific areas where Congress
sought to interfere with tribal sovereignty, the power of the tribe to
govern was completely removed; as to the residuum, however, there
was no interference with the method or manner of tribal ways.
21. 24 Stat. 390.
22. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
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Survival of tribal culture relies on both a land base and some
latitude on the part of tribal governments to govern in such a way as
to promote the indigenous culture. The ultimate unraveling of the
Cherokee culture resulted from the loss of the land base. While contemporary tribes may retain their land base, the modern threat is to
the tribes' unfettered ability to exercise their jurisdiction on the
remaining lands, and hence to utilize their lands as crucibles for the
evolution of their own ways and as refuges from the ways of the
dominant society. This threat is highlighted by comparing the Major
Crimes Act with the Indian Civil Rights Act. While the Major Crimes
Act did intrude on the Indians' ability to govern themselves, it did so
with an almost surgical precision. As to those enumerated areas of
concern, the governing ability of the tribe was completely removed,
but as to everything else, the Act left to the tribes a high degree of
freedom to construct their own internal forms of government and to
administer them according to traditional ways.
Not so with the Indian Civil Rights Act. As a consequence of the
Act, many tribal practices which were previously unchallenged are
now coming under federal court scrutiny. The Act strikes at two
pre-existing protections of Indian cultural integrity. First, the tribes,
as sovereigns, were considered to be immune from suit unless they
had specifically waived immunity or Congress had clearly removed
it.2 I Secondly, prior to the Act, the societal norms embodied in the
United States Constitution were considered inapplicable to tribal
government. 2 4 At once, the Act removed the sovereign immunity of
2
the tribe for suits arising under the Act s and made applicable to
tribal governments certain of the cultural norms embodied in the
federal constitution, most notably the due process and equal protection norms.2 6
The Indian Civil Rights Act will irresistably influence tribes to
change at least the facade, if not the substance, of their governmental
structures to more closely approximate the appearance of AngloAmerican legal institutions. This poses a two-fold threat to the tribes
and Indian culture. On the one hand, there is the potential that
Cherokee history will be recapitulated: tribal authority will wane as
evolving legal institutions deviate substantially from traditional
cultural mores. Secondly, a change in appearance in governmental
23. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
24. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal
Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959). But see In re SahQuah, 31 Fed. 327 (D.C. Alaska
1886).
25. Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971).
26. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970).
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and legal institutions may misrepresent the very nature
of tribal
government and culture.
This latter point was poignantly manifested in the
Cherokee
experience. As Professor Strickland points out, the Cherokee
system
was a melange of traditional practice overlayed with a legal
system
that increasingly diverged from the underlying values
of the tribe.
The dominant society viewed the appearance of the institutions
and
determined that the Cherokee Nation was "ready" for abolition.
The
Cherokees were not "ready" for abolition of their government.
To a
great extent, the touchstone for the Congressional
decision to
abolish the Cherokees' legal institutions was a facade.
Similarly,
contemporary tribal governmental structures and legal
institutions
may not be what they appear to be. This is especially
so when the
perceptions of the structures and institutions are filtered
through the
observer's own values and mores. This problem will intensify
as tribes
are forced to reform their governmental structures and
legal institutions in response to the Indian Civil Rights Act.
It may be that due process and equal protection norms
are not
relevant to many Indian cultures. That observation, however,
is of
merely historical interest now that Congress has imposed
a contrary
judgment through the Civil Rights Act. What is more
important,
however, is that what is comprehended by due process
and equal
protection may be substantially different for Indian cultures
than it
is for the dominant Anglo-American culture. In short, the
question is
whether the Civil Rights Act will effectuate a wholesale
importation
of the dominant culture's notions of governmental fairness
into
Indian culture or whether Indians will be given the latitude
to bend
and shape these norms to their own cultural ends. A brief
review of
some specific formulations of the problem may expose the
potential
inherent in the Civil Rights Act for the destruction of tribal
culture.
American society was founded on the eighteenth century
ideal of
individual liberty. An individual's freedom of action was
to be constrained as little as possible and only out of a compelling
necessity to
protect the commonweal. This fundamental societal value
is reflected
both in our form of government and in our legal norms. Hence,
every
high school student learns in civics class that the wonder
of the
American system of government is said to lie in its tripartite
division
of power, with its attendant checks and balances. This
system, in
theory, provides internal controls on the growth of governmental
power over individuals. We suffer this expensive form of
government
because we believe that the price of restricting governmental
power
and hence protecting individual liberty is worth paying.
The legal
norm of equal protection may also be viewed as another reflection
of
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the underlying social value of individual liberty: All Americans ought
have equal legal opportunity; no greater right accrues by virtue of
hierarchy or group affiliation.
By comparison, Indian tribes are typically centered around clans
or hierarchies; the interests of the individual are subjugated to those
of the clan or hierarchy. Thus, the imposition of the dominant
society's governmental structure and legal norms on the tribes not
only fails to recognize the traditional tribal values but may be antithetical to those values. This results in a two-fold distortion. On the
one hand, the imposed governmental structures and legal norms distort the traditional tribal values. Concomitantly, the tribes' attempts
to govern consistently with traditional values must distort the foreign
structures and norms. Appearance and reality diverge. While many
tribal governments retain the appearance of a tripartite governmental
structure, the reality of governance is quite different. Thus, often the
neat separations attendant to the tripartite structure of government
are ignored by the tribes, and the legislative and judicial functions are
combined. This may seem to create conflicts of interest in decisionmaking when viewed through the values of the dominant culture;
there may be no conflict, however, when viewed through the values
of traditional tribal culture.
An unreflective application of the Indian Civil Rights Act by the
courts may serve either to intensify existing distortions or to strike
directly at the ability of the tribes to retain their traditional culture.
This is best exemplified by looking to one case 2decided under the
court
Civil Rights Act. In White Eagle v. One Feather," a federal
require
to
Act
Rights
Civil
the
of
norm
protection
applied the equal
"one man, one vote" in voting procedures on the Standing Rock
Sioux Reservation. The court found that the "tribe itself ...has
established voting procedures precisely paralleling those commonly
found in our culture ... 28 Upon this finding, the court concluded,
"we have no problem of forcing an alien culture, with strange pro2
cedures, on this tribe." 9 The result was a wholesale 3importation of
the "one man, one vote" formulation of Baker v. Carr " to an Indian
society.
The "one man, one vote" formulation of the equal protection
norm is of relatively recent origin in American society. Moreover, it
may be viewed as flowing directly and essentially from the societal
value of individual liberty. Yet, the White Eagle court found "no
27.
28.
29.
30.

478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
478 F.2d at 1314.
Id.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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problem" in imposing the dominant society's legal norm and its concomitant societal value on the Indian culture because the Indian's
institutions appeared to the court to resemble our own. No attempt
was made to investigate the applicability of the norm or value to
traditional tribal values. Conceivably, voting districts for purposes of
tribal elections might legitimately reflect clan representation or other
such pre-European power distributions. What is most distressing
about the White Eagle approach to the Indian Civil Rights Act is not
the application of the equal protection norm to the tribe, but rather
the perception that the tribe should be precluded from working out
its own formulation.
To the extent that the Standing Rock procedures had reflected a
hierarchical or clan-oriented culture, the result of the White Eagle
decision will be to disrupt further the social fabric. In this respect,
the Civil Rights Act may have a perversely intensifying effect. As
successive constitutional norms of the dominant culture are imposed
on the tribe, the tribe will come more closely to resemble, at least
superficially, the dominant culture. And, as the White Eagle decision
reflects, the greater the superficial resemblance of the tribal institutions to those of the dominant culture, the more prone courts will be
to impose additional constitutional norms of the dominant culture
through the Civil Rights Act.
The lessons to be drawn from the Cherokee experience are clear
and portentious. As Professor Strickland demonstrates, even though
many of the forms and structures that the Cherokees adopted
appeared to be similar to the European forms and structures, the
reality was quite different. Yet, the dominant culture, in making
decisions of vital import to the Cherokees was influenced by appearance and not reality. The Civil Rights Act poses a similar threat to
the remaining Indian cultures. The willingness of courts to be
governed by appearances and their failure to probe those appearances
to ascertain the realities of tribal values and structures will severely
aggravate the dangers inherent in the Indian Civil Rights Act. The
result may very well be that while the tribes may be allowed to
preserve their present land-holdings, they may be deprived of the
ability to utilize their lands for the preservation of their cultures. The
threat to the Cherokees was posed by the "manifest destiny" of the
dominant, American society. The threat to the remaining Indian cultures from the Indian Civil Rights Act is as real.
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